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JON A. SOUDER*, SALLY K. FAIRFAX**, LARRY RUTH***

Sustainable Resources Management
and State School Lands: The Quest
For Guiding Principles
I.

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that state trust land
management is instructive for contemporary discussions of sustainability.
We juxtapose states' experience managing school trust lands with
elementary definitions of sustainability to focus and diversify debate
about sustainable resource management. The school lands were given by
Congress to the states for a clear purpose-to support public schools and
institutions-beginning with grants to Ohio in 1803 and ending with
Alaska in 1959.' The lands and funds resulting from their management
are generally viewed as a trust, with the states as trustees and the schools
and institutions as beneficiaries.2 Exploring key aspects of school lands
management and examples of how trust principles play out in actual
disputes provides vocabulary and comparative examples to enrich
conversations about moving current land management institutions toward
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1. For a history of the grants of land and their trust nature, see S. Fairfax, et al., The School
Trust Lands: A Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom, 22 Envtl. L. 797 (1992) [hereinafter Conventional Wisdom].
2. Elsewhere we have elaborated exceptions in nauseating detail. See id. at 803 passim. The
trust of which we speak is not the public trust doctrine, that ancient notion of sovereign
limits and public rights in coastal/riparian areas, but the less exotic trust of "trusts and
estates" fame. The public trust defines public rights to lands obtained by the state as
sovereign: generally, the beds and banks of navigable waterways, embayments, and the
inner coastal shore. See 1 W. Hutchins, Water Rights in the Nineteen Westerns States 102
passim (1971). Those lands are to be managed for the benefit of the public at large. See J.Sax,
Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 185
(1980); R. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources:
Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 631 (1986); C. Wilkinson, The Public
Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 269 (1980); and 1.Stephens, The Public
Trust:A Sovereign's Ancient PrerogativeBecomes the People's EnvironmentalRight, 14 U.C. Davis
L.Rev. 195 (1980). The lands we're concerned with here fall under a beneficial trust theory.
Beneficial trust is not a standard term but we rely on it to distinguish the school lands from
the sovereign lands and the public trust doctrine.
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sustainability. Most particularly the discussion suggests that simultaneous
with debating what sustainability does or could mean, attention must be
paid to the institutions that will implement and enforce the concept.
Our argument proceeds in three sections. The first section defines
the two central components of our analysis: sustainability and trust
principles. Current theories of sustainability are summarized under four
standard headings-physical, biological, economic and social. Basic
aspects of trust law are also condensed around four themes: clarity,
accountability, enforceability, and perpetuity. Sustainability and trust
principles are linked in the section by a summary of standard literature
critiquing federal sustained yield forestry. That discussion suggests both
(1) the partial and problematic approach to sustainability in a familiar
forestry application and (2) some foreseeable problems in sustainable
resource management which state trust land management experience
addresses. It also asserts that a key problem in sustainable resource
management is to be clear about what is being sustained.
Section two uses the four trust themes to structure an analysis of
state trust land management. Clarity about the beneficiary-what is being
sustained-is presented as the sine qua non of accountability. Accountability is presented in the context of detailed analyses of trust land
personnel and management investment. The discussion demonstrates the
utility of the trust commitment in preventing diversion of trust assets to
three potential claimants other than the beneficiary: the general public,
the lessee, and the manager of the trust. Preventing leaks in the system
is, we argue, critical to achieving a sustainable management regime.
Enforceability is discussed in terms of another apparently narrow issue:
obtaining fair market value. The discussion focuses on differences
between administrative review and review of trustees activities, and
argues that even so relentlessly an economic priority as fair market value
provides lessons for advocates of sustainability. Finally, the discussion of
perpetuity pushes beyond discussions of economic efficiency and
revenues. Although a trust need not be designed to maximize economic
returns, the lessons for sustainability from a trust that is so constrained
are important. Here we argue both that financially conservative management is beneficial to broader definitions of sustainability, and that the
state lands examples are relevant to more than just revenue maximization.
The final section emphasizes three major points in summarizing
the utility of trust land experience for sustainable resource management.
First, institutional structure matters. We regard the role the beneficiary
plays in clarifying and enforcing the management mandate, and in
monitoring of agency budgets, as particularly important. Second, we note
that the nature of the enforcement achieved under the trust mandate is
substantive rather than merely procedural. Finally, the trust's insistence
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on protection of the productive capabilities, in concert with the perpetual
nature of the trust responsibility, provides a working concept of
sustainable resource management.
The school trust lands are not a perfect example, in theory or in
practice, of everything advocates of sustainability might desire.?
However, they provide diverse examples of what key aspects of
sustainable resource management might look like and a valuable starting
point for discussion of both basic principles and on-the-ground problem
solving.
II. SUSTAINABILITY AND TRUST PRINCIPLES IN THEORY
This section introduces a spectrum of sustainability definitions,
standard critiques of the most familiar attempts to achieve a small part
of that spectrum, and trust principles. Much of this is familiar ground
and we retrace it in abbreviated form in order to establish context and
structure for drawing parallels between school lands and sustainability.4
Definitions of Sustainability
Definitions of sustainability come in four general flavors, each
emphasizing different aspects of the problem. These are: (1) continuing
physical production of resources; (2) continuing economic productivity of
resource production; (3) maintaining diverse biological systems; and (4)
maintaining social sustainability in communities dependent upon
resource-based economies.' The first two are time-honored notions long
familiar in resource management debates. Although the second two are
clearly related to the first two, they have emerged as central components
of the discussion in the last decade."
Physical. Traditional definitions of sustainability emphasized continuing
physical production of renewable resources, generally in terms of
volumes or amounts of goods or services of renewable resources.7 As in

3. School lands management is not even, we readily concede, a consistent example of
implementing a trust for the exclusive benefit of the beneficiaries. Much of what we have
learned is about mal-, mis-, and non-feasance. But, we continue to believe, and will argue
below, that one peculiar advantage of the trust as a management concept is that it is
possible to be minutely clear in defining chicanery and fairly successful in locating and

correcting it.
4. Those wishing a more thorough discussion should refer to G. Bogert, Trusts (6thked.
1987). See Fairfax, supra note 1, at 803-31.
5. For a more exhaustive survey, see L. Dixon and J.Fallon, The Concept of Sustainability:
Origins, Extensions, and Usefulness for Policy, 2 Soct'y and Nat. Resources 73 (1989).

6. Id.
7, R.Behan, Political Popularityand Conceptual Nonsense: The Strange Caseof Sustained Yield
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the federal forestry context to be discussed below, this is normally termed
sustained yield, and means harvesting annual or periodic growth of trees
in perpetuity.8 However, the traditional definition makes no explicit
reference to the underlying factors enabling production. Nor is there
typically any mention of results expected in terms of production levels
or of any consequent effects on users that result from its adoption.
Economic. Strict economic definitions of sustainability imply that the
resource base infinitely provides an annual flow of benefits having the
same value in real terms." Economists vigorously criticize physical
sustainability concepts because they focus on volume and do not consider
efficiency."° For example, maximizing physical yields of timber does not
preordain maximum revenues. Yet the focus on economic sustainability
does not specify whom or what benefits from the activity." Again using
a timber example, maximizing revenue is not the same thing as maximizing jobs, because fewer workers are required per unit of smaller logs
processed in newer mills."
Biological.Biological concepts of sustainability are of more recent origin and
are rooted in ecology. 13 Ecosystem sustainability is defined in terms of
stability in the numbers and amounts of species present, and their resilience
to natural and manmade perturbations. Within small areas, the expecta-

Forestry, 8 Envtl. L. 309, 321-23 (1978).
8. For a brief, insightful, history of the concept of sustained yield in forestry, see R.
Behan, id.
9. Id. at 322. Behan cites Samuelson's article, Economics of Forestryin an Evolving Society,
14 Econ. Inquiry 466-91 (1976), but discounts its importance, originality, and generality.
10. See Behan, id. at 321-32 and references cited therein.
11. Our burden here is to demonstrate that the state school lands have more to offer than
just what the economic definition of sustainability would suggest. See infra note 125 and
accompanying text.
12. Examples are found in D. Wall and B. Oswald, A Technique and Relationships for
Projections of Employment in the Pacific Coast Forest Products Industries (U.S.D.A. For.
Serv. Res. Pap. PNW-189, 1975); and Cal. Dept. of Forestry and Fire Protection, California's
Forests and Rangeland: Growing Conflict Over Changing Uses 195 (1988) [hereinafter
FRRAP Report).
13. The ecological origins of sustainability could be considered to result from the
Clementsian concept of succession to a climax D. Worster, Nature's Economy: a History of
Ecological Ideas 205 passim (1977). The climax theory of ecological succession was surpassed,
staring in the late 1960s, by the dynamic disturbance theories of the population ecologists.
M. Begon et al., Ecology: Individuals, Populationsand Communities 752-767 (2d ed. 1990) and
references therein. More recently, GAlA and Deep Ecology hypotheses conceive the Earth
as an organism whose health and stability are governed by feedback mechanisms with
humans having no primacy over other plants and animals. C. Merchant, Radical Ecology: The
Search for a Livable World 85-109 (1992).
14. FRRAP Report, supra note 12, at 286.
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tion that natural areas will maintain their composition over long periods of
time is unrealistic." Over larger areas, sustainability of biological systems
is a function of their ability to recover from disturbances."
Social. Social sustainability is closely connected to economic sustainability,
adding to it consideration of the beneficiaries and consequences of
economic activity. It is more difficult to define, however, because the
concept has been expanded beyond the customary emphasis on jobs. 7
Discussions typically include an emphasis on some or all of the following: (1)human development; (2) local control of resources; (3) increased
internal investment capacity; and (4) economic and social structures to
increase opportunity and reduce dependency. 8
Summary. The central argument of this paper is that school trust lands
experiences provide tools useful for integrating sustainability concepts
with administrative structures needed to implement them. Over the last
decades, the definitions of sustainability have become more elaborate,
complex and demanding of managers. Each of the four basic sustainability elements has diverse permutations and subparts, and each affects
and is effected by the others. Therefore, it is important to be specific
about what sustainable management is trying to sustain. Stated in the
trust terms we will outline below, who or what is the specific beneficiary
of sustainable management? A brief exploration into critiques of
sustained yield forestry as practiced by the United States Forest Service
will be used to illustrate the links between sustainability and trust
principles.

15. C. Oliver & B. Larson, ForestStand Dynamics 355-80 (1990). See also A. Chase, Playing
God in Yellowstone 92-107 (1987).
16. Oliver & Lawson, id. at 370-72.
17. The Forest Service relates social sustainability to community stability, calling it "the
rate of change with which people can cope without exceeding their capacity to deal with
it. 36 CFR 219, Subpart A. See C. Schallau, Sustained Yield Versus Community Stability: An
Unfortunate Wedding? 87 J. Forestry 16, 21 (Sept. 1989).
18. See, for example, F. Sargent, et al., Rural Environmental Planning For Sustainable
Communities 184-85 (1991). Race, gender, age, injuries are also much discussed aspects. See,
L. Fortmann, J. Kusel & S. Fairfax, Community Stability: The Foresters' Fig Leaf, in
Community Stability in Forest-Based Economies 47-48 (D. LeMaster & J. Beuter eds., 1989). See
also, J. Kusel, It's Just Like Baseball: A Study of Forest Community Well-Being 28-31 (1991)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Berkeley)).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

Sustained Yield
Efforts to include sustainability in federal public resource
management have been spotty. Cooperative Sustained Yield Timber Units 9
managed by the United States Forest Service are probably the most
familiar federal attempt at sustainable resource management. Established
under the Sustained Yield Forest Management Act of 1944, the units are
clearly based in the physical volume approach:
In order to promote the stability of forest industries, of
employment, of communities, and of taxable forest wealth,
through continuous supplies of timber; in order to provide for a
continuous and ample supply of forest products; and in order
to secure the benefits of forests in maintenance of water
supply, regulation of stream flow, prevention of soil erosion,
amelioration of climate, and preservation of wildlife ...
(emphasis added)
The physical approach was extended from timber to other forest
resources by the Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960:
'Sustained yield of the several products and services' means
the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of a high-level
annual or regular periodic output of the various renewable
resources of thb national forests without impairment of the
productivity of the land.2
Critics of Forest Service programs have long argued that this
mandate has not been translated into criteria that are meaningfully
applied to the broad range of decisions necessary for management of
lands and resources.' A major theme of the critique is that its goals are
not clearly defined. Lawyers discuss this flaccid multiple use direction in
terms of excessive discretion, no "law to apply";23 foresters refer to it as

19. In almost all instances, these units were unsuccessful. See H. Steen, The U.S. Forest
Service: A History 251-52 & nn.8,9 (1976), and references cited therein. See also, S. Dana & S.
Fairfax, Forest and Range Policy, Its Development in the United States 167-68 (2d ed. 1980);
Schallau, supra note 17, at 16, 20; and D. Wear, et al., Even-Flow Timber Harvests and
Community Stability, 87 J. Forestry 24, 27 (Sept. 1989).
20. Sustained Yield Forest Management Act of 1944, §58 Stat. 132 (current version at 16
U.S.C. 583, §1).
21. Multiple Use - Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 215 (currnet versin at 16 U.S.C.
531, §4(b)). Multiple use is defined in §4(a) of the Act as ".. . the management of all the
various renewable surface resources of the national forest so that they are utilized in the
combination that will best meet the needs of the American people... without impairment
of the productivity of the land, with consideration being given to the relative values of the
various resources, and not necessarily the combination of uses that will give the greatest
dollar return or the greatest unit output."
22. Behan, supra note 7, at 336-42.
23. Coggins and Wilkinson note that "no lower court struck down any important Forest
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the "succotash syndrome."24 Economists note the absence of clear
directives and tools for monitoring.73 Confronted with a mushy
directive, the Forest Service, according to the standard critique, acts
rationally and then is accused of maximizing to its own internal
benefit. ' Standard explanations of how this happens can be separated
into three related categories.
First, the Forest Service does not value all of the products of its
lands at a fair market price.'
Such is typically seen in its undervaluation of grazing, water and recreation."' A second criticism is that
the Forest Service subsidizes certain activities, such as road construction
and insect and disease control, with the proceeds from other activities,
notably timber production.' This is customarily done by using revenues from an income-producing activity to subsidize non-monetary, nonpriced activities.'o Alternatively, the agency balances costs for commodity production programs against non-quantifiable or non-monetary
benefits, such as recreation or "community stability." This cross-subsidization can occur because of inadequate cost accounting, the third major
criticism of Forest Service sustained yield management.3'
Our argument depends in part on associating the managerial
requirements to achieve sustainability-whatever its definition-and
those found in trust management. Current problems in sustained yield

Service action until a district court in 1970 enjoined issuance of a timber contract for
violations of the Wilderness Act (Parkerv. United States, 309 F.Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1070))."
They attribute the recent "boom in public land litigation" to several factors, including the
fact that Congress began to enact "hard statutory law" rather than the "vague, discretionary
mandate" of the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act." G. Coggins and C. Wilkinson, Federal
Public Land and Resources Law 279 (2d ed. 1987). See also, J. McCloskey, Natural Resources
- National Forests - The Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 41 Or. L. Rev. 49 (1961).
24. Behan, The Succotash Syndrome, or Multiple Use: A Heartfelt Approach to Forest Land
Management, 7 Nat. Res. J.473 (1967).
25. R. O'Toole, Reforming the Forest Service 185-188 (1987)
26. Id. passim (1987) is the most prominent critic of the Forest Service. Others have also
made the budget-maximization case. See R. Johnson, The Budget MaximizationHypothesis and
the USDA Forest Service, 1 Renewable Resources J. 8 (1983) and Off. of Tech. Assessment,
Forest Service Planning: Accommodating Uses, Producing Outputs, and Sustaining
Ecosystems 43-49 passim (1992) [hereinafter OTA Report]. See also Reich, The Public and the
Nation's Forests, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 381 (1962).
27. O'Toole, id. at xii, 82-86, 72. OTA Report, id. at 42, 147.
28. O'Toole, id. at 72. OTA Report, id. at 147. See also, H.R. Rep. No. 593,99th Cong., 2nd
Sess., Federal Grazing Program: All Is Not Well on the Range 5-10 (1986).
29. O'Toole, id. at 72, 89, 90-92. See also, OTA Report, id. at 148-50, 154-57.
30. O'Toole, id. at 119-22, 127-30, 187.
31. O'Toole, id. at 28 passim. The OTA Report, supra note 26, at 154 discusses this in terms
of "off-budget" funding. See also, R. Wolf, National ForestTimber Sales and the Legacy of Gifford
Pinchot: Managinga Forest and Making It Pay, 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1037, passim (1989) for a
detailed history.
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forestry are not the only ones which confront managers attempting to
manage sustainability, nor are all the problems of traditional sustained
yield forestry resolved by lessons from the school trusts. However, the
trust mandate is a broadly understood and widely applied working
model that can provide useful insight into overcoming the obstacles
identified in critiques of Forest Service management. The next section will
introduce trust principles using the structure of our conceptual mantra-clarity, accountability, enforceability, perpetuity-to emphasize the
relationship between trust principles and sustainable resource management, most particularly in the area of institutional arrangements for
achieving sustainability.
Trust Principles
A trust is a fiduciary relationship in which the trustee is required
to manage the trust asset for the exclusive benefit of the beneficiaries. 2
The primary duty of the trustee is to act with undivided loyalty to the
specified beneficiary.' Other trust duties are elaborated in ancient
common law principles, state statute, and case law.
Clarity. A key characteristic of trust principles is clarity of the goal:
manage the trust resources for the benefit of the beneficiary. Clarity is
potentiated by the principle of undivided loyalty: the trustee is strictly
forbidden from diverting trust resources to others.' The trustee can
tolerate uncompensated use only if it does not impose costs on the
beneficiary.3
Accountability. Clarity of goals facilitates accountability. The trustee must
exercise prudence, skill, and diligence in making the trust productive for
32. Conventional Wisdom, supra note 1, at 883-87. See also Restatement (Second) of
Trusts §§ 2, 3, & 4 (1959).
33. Although the existence of a trust can be implied in the absence of a specific statement
or document, the normal route to establishing one involves a trust "instrument." The
instrument identifies the trustee and the beneficiary, and it allows the trustor to specify
terms and conditions for implementation of the trust.
34. Undivided loyalty does not mean that an investment or activity is disallowed if it
coincidentally benefits someone other than the beneficiary, but it does bar programs that
impose costs or reduce benefits in order to achieve a collateral or general benefit. See,
Oklahoma Educ. Assoc. v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230 (Okla. 1982); County of Skamania v. State, 685
P.2d 576 (Wash. 1984); and Eruien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41 (1919).
35. Richard Pederson, consultant to the state land board of Colorado, notes that managers
of private trusts routinely make charitable donations when they have reason to believe that
the status of the trust will be enhanced by the good community relations that putatively
accrue to such donations. Personal communication, St. George, Utah, winter 1992 meeting
of the Western State Land Commissioners' Assocation.
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the specified beneficiary.' The trustee must hold trust property separate
from other property owned or managed by the trustee, and must also
deal with the beneficiary with fairness, openness, and honesty.3 ' In
order to meet that standard, the trustee is specifically and comprehensively accountable to the beneficiary. The trustee must keep property records,
accounts of receipts and disbursements, and must furnish this information to the beneficiary on demand. '
Enforceability.Trust doctrine allows the beneficiary3 to sue to enforce the
terms of the trust. Trust obligations are fully elaborated in common law,
and statutes and many centuries of judicial experience in enforcing the
trust doctrine.
Perpetuity. Preserving the corpus of the trust is one of any trustee's
fundamental obligations. Ordinarily, beneficial trusts are not necessarily
perpetual: a trust might be liquidated, for example, at the instruction of
the trustor, when a beneficiary reaches a certain age or when the
purposes for which the trust was established are achieved.' The trust
purposes can also be changed or the trust terminated if the purpose for
which the trust was established is no longer reasonable.' The school
land trusts peculiar emphasis on perpetuity will be elaborated in the next
section.
Summary. Sustainability concepts have become more complex in the past
several decades. Increasingly sophisticated biological and social definitions will be more and more difficult to specify and achieve. The Forest
Service experience with sustained yield forestry provides a starting point

36. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 170-83 (1959).
37. Id. See also, Conventional Wisdom, supra note 1, at 853-55.
38. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 172, 173, 179.1-.2 (1959).
39. Or others with an identifiable interest. Restatement (Second) Trusts §172. See, the
Arizona and New Mexico situation. "Nothing herein contained shall be taken as in
limitation of the power of the State or of any citizen thereof to enforce the provisions of this
Act." New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act §28, 36 Stat. 557, ch. 310 (1910). Cited in Lassen v.
Arizona Highway Dep't., 385 U.S. 458, 472 app. to opinion (1967), reversing State of Arizona
ex. rel Arizona Highway Department v. Lassen, 407 P.2d 747 (1965). Other states are more
problematical, see Conventional Wisdom, supranote 1,at n.194 and accompanying text. Most
recently, see Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment at 26-47,
Selkirk-Priest Basin Assoc. v. Idaho, (1st. Dist, Idaho, 1992) (No. CV-92-0037).
40. "If by the terms of the trust, the trust is to continue only until the expiration of a
certain period or until the happening of a certain event, the trust will be terminated upon
the expiration of the period or the happening of the event." Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 334 (1959).
41. This is the cy pres doctrine of charitable trusts. Conventional Wisdom, supra note 1,
at 875-77 and references therein.
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for identifying problems in implementing even simple notions of
sustainability: unclear goals, undervaluing some outputs and subsidizing
others, and inadequate accounting.
Trust principles embody a clear goal and an elaborate mechanism
for monitoring and enforcing adherence to goals. The next section
introduces state experience managing school trust lands and analyzes
ways in which clarity, accountability, enforceability and perpetuity
concepts enhance sustainable resource management discussions.
III. Trust Management Systems and Sustainability
This section begins with a brief overview of the state school land
resources and organizational structures--just enough information to
render the subsequent analysis penetrable.' We then use our four trust
themes of clarity, accountability, enforceability and perpetuity to analyze
trust land management in the context of sustainability.
Overview of the Lands, Resources, and State Lands Organization
The school lands were granted at or near statehood as part of the
accession process and preliminary rules for their management are found
in the state Constitutions and, less frequently and in considerably less
detail, in the state's Enabling Act.'
Trust Corpus: State Lands and Resources." The corpus of the state school
lands trust refers to three kinds of assets: (1) the lands granted to the
states by the Federal government, (2) the proceeds from the sale and use
of the lands, and (3) the permanent funds that hold the proceeds not
distributed on an annual basis. Although every state joining the Union
since 1803 has received lands, only twenty-five states presently manage
42. The economic models and the analysis of the case study states are based on material
found in J. Souder, Economic Strategies for the Management of School and Institutional
Trust Lands: A Comparative Study of Ten Western States (1990) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of California (Berkeley)) [hereinafter Economic Strategies].
43. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 854-55. Although Congress-the putative trustor in the
present example-had relatively little to say until the very end of the state-making process
about trust or school land management, in nearly a century of constitution drafting, states
were increasingly specific. State constitutions detailed parameters for leasing and selling
school lands, the contents of and priorities for investing the resulting permanent school'
funds, and myriad other trust management conditions. Id. at 877-83. See also, K. Bradley,
Land Grants and the Western States: The Significance of Admissions Historiesand National Politics
(1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); and S. Fairfax and J.Souder, State
Accession Documents Provisions Relating to Grants of School and Related Lands, Working
Paper 90-94 (1990) (on file with the authors).
44. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 818-20.
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trust lands. 45 Current surface land holdings range from less than three
thousand acres in Nevada to eighty-five million acres in Alaska.'
Grazing is the largest surface use in all states, occupying a low of about
thirteen percent (but still the most extensive use) of the trust land in
California to one-hundred percent in Wyoming.47 The other most
common surface use is timber production: Washington uses seventy
percent of its land for timber, Oregon, fifty-five percent,' and Idaho,
twenty-five percent.49 Commercial leasing and development-warehouses to condos-are attracting attention in some states, but the
revenues produced are not yet significant. The largest sub-surface use is
oil and gas leasing. The only other extensive sub-surface land leases are
for strip mining coal production, primarily in Montana, New Mexico, and
Wyoming.- °
Revenues. Revenues produced from trust lands uses fluctuate widely from
year to year, especially for those resources that produce large amounts of
revenues for the states: timber and oil and gas.-" Although grazing is the
largest land use, oil and gas revenues are generally the states largest
money-earner, although in Washington, Idaho, and Oregon timber
provides a major portion of trust revenues. Land, when sold for cash as
opposed to under a sales contract, constitutes another area where year-toyear revenue variance is extreme. Traditional cropland and grazing uses
provide a stable-albeit relatively low-level of funds. Only in Colorado
and Montana do these uses provide more than five percent of the
revenues arising from the trust lands, even though cropland and grazing
management is often the major focus of the land offices.

45. Based on the membership of the Western States Land Commissioners Association
(WSLCA) and four eastern states. States with trust lands are Alabama (AL), Alaska (AK),
Arizona (AZ), California (CA), Colorado (CO), Hawaii (HI), Idaho (ID), Louisiana (LA),
Minnesota (MN), Montana (MT), Nebraska (NB), Nevada (NV), New Mexico (NM), North
Dakota (ND), Oklahoma (OK), Oregon (OR), South Dakota (SD), Texas (TX), Utah (UT),
Washington (WA), Wisconsin (WI), and Wyoming (WY). Arkansas is a member of the
WSLCA but manages no trust lands. Western States Land Comm'rs Ass'n, Directory, (198889) [hereinafter WSLCA Directory].
46. Id. passim.
47. Souder, supra note 42, tbl. 2-2b at 25.
48. This figure includes land managed by the Oregon Department of Forestry under the
trust doctrine with the counties as beneficiaries, Or. Rev. Stat. § 530.030 (1992 Supp.).
49. Souder, supra note 42, tbl. 2-2b at 25.
50. Id. Colorado and Utah also produce coal from trust lands, but their mines are
subsurface so require less land.
51. We have compiled comparative data on revenues and leased acreage for the period
from 1970 to the present, and on employment allocated to the various trust land management programs for the period from 1986 to 1990 for most of the states with trust lands. The
ebbs and flows in revenues are evident from examination of this data.
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Some revenues produced from the trust lands are distributed
directly to the beneficiaries, while others are deposited into the permanent school fund with only the dividends disbursed.5 2 Typically,
revenues produced from renewable resources are distributed, while those
from non-renewable sources-including land sales-are put in the
beneficiaries' permanent fund. Timber revenues are handled differently
depending upon the state. For example, in Arizona and Oregon these
revenues are placed in the permanent fund, while in the other states
timber proceeds are distributed.s' Oregon is also different from other
states: all its trust lands revenues are placed in its permanent fund.'
OrganizationalStructureand Funding. State land offices are delegated to act
as the trustees to manage these lands and their resources for the
beneficiaries. Two general organizational structures are used. Five states
have elected land commissioners who have considerable power.55 Other
states have a board of land commissioners composed of either elected
officials or citizens or both.Funding mechanisms used to manage trust lands and assets also
vary among the states.57 Some states designate a percentage of receipts
for management: this percentage varies from a low of 2.5 percent in
Montana to a high of 36 1/4 percent in Oregon.' Other states allow
only the net revenues, after management expenses are deducted, to go to
the beneficiaries s The remaining states are dependent upon the
legislature to provide adequate funding. Even in the states where a
percentage of revenues is designated for management expenses, the
legislature appropriates funds for land office expenditures. 60

52. See, Fairfax, supra note 1, at 836-41, 879-83; Souder, supra note 42, at 28-34, respectively,
for a fuller description of the historicalevolution and current practices in revenues distribution.
53. Souder, supra note 42, at 29.
54. Id.
55. These states are Arkansas, New Mexico, South Dakota, Texas, and Washington.
WSLCA Directory, supra note 45, passim.
56. Id. Practically every state is different, even states that came in under the same
Enabling Act. The directory lists the members of the Commissions where they exist. A
discussion of the organizational structures in the ten case states is provided in J.Souder and
S. Fairfax, The State School Trust Lands, Working Paper 90-1, 28-32 & fig. 3 at 29 (1990) (on
file with the authors).
57. Souder, supra note 42, tbl. 2-5 at 37.
58. Id. In Oregon's case, this is the percentage retained by the Departiaent of Forestry for
management of school trust timber lands, Or. Rev. Stat. § 530.520 (1992 Supp.).
59. Souder, supra note 42, tbl. 2-5 at 37. New Mexico can retain-but doesn't-up to 100
percent of revenues not required to be placed in the permanent fund, subject to appropriation by the legislature (N.M.Stat. Ann. § 19-1-11, -18 (1991 Supp.), as passed in 1989 N.M.
Laws ch. 15, § 1. California and Oregon allow this from all revenues.
60. Id.
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State school lands, resources and management structures are very
diverse. Many interesting lessons can be found in comparisons between
and among the twenty-two state's programs. But what they have in
common is most relevant to our arguments about sustainability. We turn,
therefore, to a discussion of how the trust mandate plays out in actual
issues relevant to sustainable resource management, structuring our
discussion around the four parts of the trust mandate, beginning with
clarity.
Analysis of Trust Land Management
Clarity. The defining characteristic of school trust land management is
specificity regarding goals.' Unlike the very vague "multiple-use'
mandate which guides management of Forest Service and BLM
lands-the management of all the various renewable surface resources
of the national forests so that they are utilized in the combination that will
best meet the needs of the American people"S---the state trust lands are
managed to meet fairly specific needs of clearly identified beneficiaries.
Clarity arises from two major factors: the first is the brevity and
consistency with which the purpose of the grants, and their acceptance, is
stated throughout the accession process. Typically, the basic language
describing the purpose of the grants is contained in a single sentence or
paragraph." The wordiest basic documents do not exceed a page or

61. This is a significant distinction between trust land management and federal lands
management. Compare the description of the problems of multiple-use problems on federal
lands described in M. Clawson, Forests for Whom and For What? (1975) with state trust
lands management described herein.
62. See, Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-51 (1988); National Forest
Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-47 (1988); Federal Land Policy and Management Act,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1988). Supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
63. Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. 531 §4(a) (emphasis added).
George Coggins has tried to say that multiple use means something, imposes some enforceable standards, but other commentators and the courts demur. See, G. Coggins, Of Succotash
Syndromes and Vacuous Platitudes:The Meaning of "Multiple Use, Sustained Yield" For Public
Land Management, 53 U. Colo. L. Rev. 229 (1982); see also, J. McCloskey, supra note 23; and
Dorothy Thomas Found v. Hardin, 317 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. N.C. 1970).
64. We are still struck by the wisdom of a comment made many years ago by Ron
Sandoe, now director of the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources. He observed that
the federal agencies were burdened by reams of statute and regulation telling them in
enormous and conflicting detail how to do their job, but had nothing to which they could
turn to tell them what to do. He compared that to the state trust land managers' mandate,
which contains little procedural guidance but strict priorities about what to produce and for
whom.
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two. 6 The dominant theme of grant program-to raise money for the
support of schools-never changed."
Equally important to our argument, clarity arises because the trustee's
duty to produce revenues for the beneficiary is not unconstrained: it does
not overrule the clear commitment to protecting the corpus and productive
capacity of the trust. Furthermore, recent cases have made clear that it does
not preclude non-use where there is a possibility that future productivity
will be thereby enhanced.67 We will argue below that this clarity about
goals and constraints-although it emphasizes revenue production-tends
toward conservative management. In this section, we seek merely to underscore the peculiar clarity of the mandate for sustainability and show how
it plays out in specific disputes.
This clarity of the mandate is controlling without reliance, it is worth
noting, on trust language or principles. Soon after statehood the New
Mexico legislature authorized the Commissioner of Public Lands to spend
up to three per cent of the annual income from sale and lease of lands to
advertise the advantages of all of the lands available for sale in the state of
New Mexico. The United States Supreme Court held that dedication of the
lands to purposes specified in the Enabling Act was "special and exact" and
the purposes of the grant were "necessarily exclusive of any other purpose."' The Court specifically refused to discuss a "breach of trust." The
phrase ". . . means no more in the present case than that the United States,
being the grantor of the lands, could impose conditions upon their
use ....
"69 Trust resources would not be diverted to an alleged general
public benefit.
However, the mandate's clarity is, as noted above, potentiated by the
trust principle of undivided loyalty. In Lassen v. Arizona Highway Department.' some fifty years later, the Court interpreted the same Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act to determine whether and how the state
65. From state to state, and even within states, in the several key documents, there is
slight variation in the specific language used as describing the purpose for which the land
was granted and accepted: the lands were to be used to support schools. The differences
observed in the phrases used at different times and places-between "for educational
purposes," "for the support of common schools," or "for the support of schools"--could be
decisive in the context of allocating a specific resource in a particular factual situation.
Fairfax, supra note 1, at 818-20 and accompanying references. Oregon has tried to find
additional flexibility in the most flexible of all mandates, see 46 Op. Att'y Gen. __ No.
8223, slip op. at 7-22 (July 24, 1992).
66. Although the specific language did vary with some arguable import for management
priorities. See, Fairfax, supra note 1, at 801.
67. See, Havasu Heights Ranch and Dev. Corp. v. State Land Dep't., 764 P.2d 37 (Ariz.
App. 1988), discussed below, notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
68. Ervien v. United States, supra note 34, at 47.
69. Id. at 48.
70. Lassen, supra note 39.
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might gain access to school lands for highway purposes without going
through the auction procedures specified in the grant. In Lassen, the
founding mandate is supplemented by discussion of basic trust principles.
The Court rejected the highway department's assertion, and the Arizona
Supreme Court's holding, that any enhancement in trust value stemming
from the highway construction should be deducted from the amount owed
to the trust for the easements across school lands.' "Words more clearly
designed.. to create definite and specific trusts... could hardly have been
chosen," noted the court, citing the State Appeals Court decision in the
earlier Ervien case. n
Trust principles are also applied to prevent the legislature from
diverting trust resources to the lessee through management directives. In
ASARCO v. Kadish,' for example, the court held that the legislature could
not establish a maximum, or flat, royalty fee for production of minerals
from trust lands outside the competitive bidding process. The Court
disallowed the legislatively set maximums even though the state Constitution clearly states that the school lands shall be managed "as the State
legislature may direct." If "the blanket authority" in the Constitution
authorizes the legislature to allow below market leasing, the Court
reasoned, "it would allow minerals to be leased for little or no royalty, and
thus would leave room for all the abuses that the establishment of a school
trust was designed to prevent. ' 7I
Clarity is, according to the standard political science text on policy
implementation, the key and pervasive pre-condition of "effective
implementation".' It is impossible to evaluate compliance with and

71. Id. at 466.
72. Ervien, supra note 34, at 279.
73. ASARCO v. Kadish, 109 S. Ct. 2037,2052 (1989). See also, Kadish v. Arizona State Land
Dept., 155 Ariz. 484,747 P.2d 1183 (1987) for the Arizona Supreme Court's original decision
overruling the existing Arizona minerals leasing statute.
74. adish, id., at 2052, citing § 1(b) of the Jones Act, 44 Stat. 1026 (19_..). This is based on
the procedural requirements for leases under § 28 of the New Mexico - Arizona Enabling
Act of June 20, 1910, 36 Stat. 557 (19_.). Arizona's minerals leasing regulations were
overturned because, even after the Jones Act, they were not in conformity with § 28; by
comparison, soon after passage of the Jones Act, New Mexico successfully petitioned
Congress to allow it to change its mineral leasing procedures so that advertisement,
appraisal, and bidding procedures, required under general leases were not required for
mineral leases. Id. at 2052 n.5 (citing Joint Resolution No. 7, ch. 28, 45 Stat. 58 (1927). Thus,
New Mexico, by changing its Enabling Act and Constitution, was able to legally lease
minerals under terms equivalent to those found to violate the original Enabling Act that
brought both states into the Union. In fact, Arizona revised its Enabling Act in 1936 and
1951 to remove the original leasing requirements from hydrocarbon minerals. However,
this revision did not effect hardrock minerals. Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 517, 49 Stat. 1477
(1936) and Act of June 2, 1951, 65 Stat. 51 (1951) id. at 2050, 2053.
75. D. Mazmanian and P. Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy 41 (1983). See also, P.
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progress toward goals, or even to proceed toward them, unless the goals
are clearly stated. Our argument linking trust principles and sustainability
parallels that general frame: clarity, we assert, permits tying resource
management to the achievement of objectives. This linkage is particularly
crucial when dealing with potentially imprecise concepts such as sustain-

ability.
Accountability. Accountability in school trust land management is an
intersection of two factors. The first is clarity--one clear implication of the
previous discussion is that we know specifically what we are accounting
for and how to measure it.76 The second is the trustee's duty to fully
disclose. Disclosure requires the trustee to retain trust documents and
vouchers, and to keep records,' to furnish information to the beneficiary, 8 and to hold trust assets separate from others under his or her
control."
Records are required specifically because they permit evaluation of
managers' compliance with the trust mandate to benefit the beneficiary.
The crucial question continues to be: who is benefiting from management
of the trust. Lassen, Ervien and Kadisho' demonstrate the utility of the clarity
of the trust mandate in assuring that the beneficiary enjoys the benefits,
specifically by preventing diversion of resources to putative general public
benefits and the lessees.81 Accountability is also central in pursuing an

Sabatier, Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research: a CriticalAnalysis
and Suggested Synthesis, 6 J. Public Policy 21 (1986).
76. To those who argue that dollars are not a good output indicator, we say yes,
absolutely, but these are data representing tradeoffs that we all understand. The difficulty
in measuring management performance is at the heart of why revenues are commonly
defended as a standard. We will broaden this approach somewhat when we talk about
efficient personnel allocation. See also, Office. of Legis. Auditor Gen., State of Utah, A
Performance Audit of the Division of State Lands and Forestry 13-24 (November, 1992) for
an indication of the difficulties one state had in estimating personnel efficiencies.
77. Restatement (second) of Trusts §172 (1959),
78. Id. at §173.
79. Id. at §179.1-.2.
80. Supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
81. Many legal cases interpreting accountability in the state trust land management
context are tangential to our argument, tending to deal with who can sign payment
vouchers, and timeliness of agency actions. For example, a series of cases from Idaho dealt
with the operations of the state land department and the state investment council,
specifically their relationship to the State Treasurer's office, including what type of
accounting procedures would be used and how maintenance funds are to be handled. Moon
v. Investment Board, 525 P.2d 335, 338-339, 96 Idaho 140, 143-44 (1974); State ex rel. Moon
v. State Bd. of Examiners, 662 P.2d 221, 223 (Idaho 1983); and Moon v. State Bd. of Land
Com'rs., 724 P.2d 125, 129-30 (Idaho 1986). A case from Montana allows agency discretion
in refusing to renew a lease when rentals were not paid; the plaintiff had contended that
the agency was arbitrary and capricious by not approving a lease assignment within two
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even harder target: assessing whether trust assets are being diverted to
benefit the manager. The courts have consistently maintained that the
trustee must show a direct connection between its actions and undivided
loyalty to the beneficiary-82
Trust principles cast the issue of compliance with the mandate in terms
of undivided loyalty to the beneficiary. Because of the accountability
requirements of the trust mandate we have data to examine the efficacy of
state land management programs. While not all states provide sufficient
information in exactly the right format to permit the kind of cross-state
comparisons we would like to make, the states do provide sufficient
information to enable useful inquiry. The analysesa that follow pursue the
issue of undivided loyalty into three specific organizational issues relevant
to sustainability:
(1) Allocation of personnel to resource management programs-is the
trustee diverting trust resources to employees by over investing in
management or failing to invest adequately to make the trust fully
productive?
(2) Funding mechanisms--does the way the trustee obtains operating
funds affect its ability to pursue trust purposes?
(3) Organizational structure-does organizational style and type have any
discernible impact of the trustee's ability to achieve trust goals?

weeks. Jeppeson v. State, Dep't. of State Lands, 667 P.2d 428, 433 (Mont. 1983).
82. This is no trivial accomplishment. Supra at notes 26-32 and accompanying text. The
connection between the trustee responsibilities of undivided loyalty and accountability was
demonstrated in Skamania, supra note 34, where the effects on the beneficiaries of holding
state timber purchasers to their contracts was considered: "The Act in this case released
valuable contract rights held by the DNR. The primary justification for this action was based
on the testimony of a forestry consultant, that is, that the Act was necessary to preserve
competition, maintain timber prices in the future, and encourage timely contract
performance." County of Skanrania v. State, 685 P2d 576 (Wash. 1984). 'The testimony of a
forestry consultant is simply too speculative and conjectural to justify the Act's provisions.
We hold that no prudent trustee could conclude that the unilateral termination of these
contracts was in the best interests of the trust." Id. at 582, 583. The central issue in the
federal "below cost timber sale" issue is that generations of Forest Service critics and
analysts cannot use agency data to establish accountability. Wolf, supra note 31, at 1072-76.
See also, H. Rept. No. 171, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 65-67 (1977). OTA Report, supra note 26, at
111-13.
83. School trust lands management was analyzed by incorporating readily available data
into production models which describe the processes that yield revenues. Activity, or inputout, analysis, was the type of production model used here. This model shows the amounts
of inputs-generally labor, capital, and land-required to produce a unit of output. The
input amount-or intensity-is denoted as the coefficient for that factor. For land the
intensity coefficient is usually in acres of land of a specific type; for labor the intensity
coefficient used here will be the number full-time employees (FTEs) allocated to the
management of a specific resource.
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To test whether trust assets were being diverted to benefit the manager,
we used common measures of performance: (1) the return per employee
required to produce a commodity; and (2) the revenues per acre of land
dedicated to a specific use." Efficient personnel allocation criterion is that,
ceteris paribus, the return per employee should be similar across management programs within a state.'
Personnel Expenditures. Once beneficiaries are identified and objectives
established, the actual implementation of management programs by
necessity should be done efficiently. By far the largest management
expenditure in the state land offices is on personnel, costs which could
either be used for other activities or passed on to the beneficiaries. Efficient
personnel allocation is critical for sustainable resources management.
Table 1 shows how personnel are allocated in relation to revenues received. The percentages in the table represent the amount of revenues returned per employee in one program (the left-hand side) compared to the
returns per employee in another program (the right-hand side).' Efficient
personnel allocation criterion requires that the ratio of labor productivity
between any two programs should be approximately equal to one, i.e., that
their relative value is equivalent.8 7 Significant divergence from one
hundred percent indicates potential problem areas.' For analytical
84. For revenues, gross and net (minus expenditures) receipts are the measures used to
indicate returns to the trust. Management efficiency is characterized by: (1) expenditures,
(2) expenditures as a percent of revenues, (3) expenditure per acre, and (4) return per
employee (the labor factor from the activity analysis, id.). Two other factors were examined
to control for other possible sources of variation between states. First, land quality was expressed as (1) total acres leased, (2) acres leased by resource use, and (3) gross revenues per
acre (both total and by resource use - the land factor, id.). Secondly, any effects of state land
office organization were tested using a classification of whether the land commissioner is
elected (NM, WA), whether the land board is active in the day-to-day management of the
office (CA, CO, OR, UT), or whether the land office is highly influenced by the state
executive or another state office (ID, MT, WY).
85. Note that we are talking here about the ceteris paribus conditions for personnel
assignment within a state, and not between states. Within a state, revenues produced per
employee should be roughly equivalent across programs, unless-through a planning
process--explicit offsets are recognized between current revenues and potential future ones
that would result from "investing" personnel to other activities. If all things are not equal,
then the state should have a program to rectify the inequalities.
86. Note that the percentages themselves are derived from the ratios of pairs of labor
factor returns, and as such are unitless:
($/FTE,, / $/FEs). 100.
By converting to percentages, the interpretation is than a unit of labor in the left-hand (LHS)
use returns X percent of the revenues of a unit of labor allocated to the program on the
right-hand (RHS) side.
87. Basic source for this material is Souder, supra note 42, at 83-92, particularly tbl, 4-6 at
85, revised in form as Table 1.
88. Two assumptions are required prior to applying this criterion: (1) wage rates must be
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purposes, we examined the data on an individual resource basis as well as
aggregated into surface, minerals, and land sales programs.
The results in Table 1 show that there are orders of magnitude
differences among states in labor factor return ratios at the aggregate
program level. Relative contributions from renewable compared to nonrenewable program range from 2 percent in New Mexico to 2,600 percent
in Montana. This means that New Mexico receives fifty times as much
revenue per employee in its mineral leasing programs compared to the
return for managing surface resources. The converse is true in Montana:
there the return per employee in surface management is twenty-six times
as great as those engaged in minerals resources management.
Table 1.

Comparative revenue returns from the allocation of personnel among
resource programs.'
I AZ ICA

PROGRAM LEVEL PERCENTAGES
Renewable -+ Non-renewable
Lands -4 Non-renewable

I CO I

ID

I

MT INM

I oF rIW

W

b

234% 2,612%1

18%

3%

24%

139%

3%

30% 2,084%

312%

2%

24%

3%

388%

25%

487%

134%

6,239%

8%

Renewable -+ Lands

13%

980%j11%

836%j9

5%

2%

6%

Renewable -4 Grand Total

30%

10%

59%

179%

5%

24%

10%

99%

12%

168%

335%

243%

34%

7%

215%

99%

314%

25%

153%

33%

565%

19%

2346%

Non-renewable -+ Grand Total

RESOURCE LEVEL PERCENTAGES
Crop & Grazing -Timber

Crop & Grazing-

Commercial

2,038%

80%

b

450%

60%

31%

92% 336%

41%

100%

363%

120%

131%

2D0%

02%

20% 561%

124%

130%

1,041%

Commercial -+ Land Sales

28%

82%

24%

21%

4% 4,226%

1%

Commercial -+ Land Program

74%

144%

31%

10%

4%

1%

Timber-

Commercial

4%

a. Source: Economic Strategies, supra note 42, tbl 4-6 at 85.
b. Percentages are determined from the ratios of the labor factor coefficients. A percentage of 100% means

that equivalent revenues per employee (FIE) are received from the program to the left of thn' arrow
compared to the program on the right. Percentages higher than one hundred indicate the relatively greater
amount that the program on the right receives compared to the one on the left. The converse is true for
percentages less than one hundred.

equal across the programs, or must be adjusted to reflect the differences; and (2) the marginal
contribution of labor is the same across the programs. Non-renewable resources staff levels
were adjusted downward twenty percent to account for wage differentials between surface
versus mineral management personnel as required by the first assumption. This differential
is based on data obtained for salaries in the California State Lands Commission, California
State Legislature, Regular Session, Govenor's Budget Proposal (1989), and was conceptually
concurred with by Mr. Kevin Carter, Unit Manager for Trust & Asset Management, Utah
Division of State Lands and Forestry, during an interview in Salt Lake City, Utah (July 24,
1991). We have also used the average contribution, rather than the marginal contribution for
the labor factor; and because this violates the second assumption-and the fact that revenues
fluctuate much more on an annual basis than personnel levels-a strict interpretation should
be avoided. Regardless, the information obtained from this analysis point to some very
interesting management problems within the state land offices.
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The results on an individual resource management level are also informative, particularly in the surface management programs. The agriculture
and grazing, and forestry programs show a better balance than between the
aggregate surface and minerals programs. The differences in balances
among the states is also interesting. Oregon, Utah and Colorado are relatively well-balanced in personnel allocations between these two programs.
Arizona, California, Montana, and Wyoming put many more employees in
their forestry programs-when compared to agriculture and grazing-than
the revenues appear to justify. In Idaho and Washington, the returns per
employee in the agriculture and grazing programs are much less than the
revenues per employee managing their forestry programs. 9
An analysis similar to the above should be able to be applied to sustainable management programs. The major insight from our study supports our
contention infra that states should manage those lands that give them the
biggest return in terms of the beneficiaries' objectives.' Clearly, the
magnitude of the differences in revenues produced per employee among
the various states' programs is considerable. This imbalance may be a
coincidence of fluctuating annual revenues and "sticky" staffing patterns.
But states should at least be cognizant of this problem, and how it may be
effected by either their past "agency culture," or as a result of funding
mechanisms.
Organizational Structure. The land office's organizational structure affects
its ability to generate returns to the trust.9 We found that the percentage
89. Efficiency criteria indicate whether the state land office is allocating personnel to
produce maximum revenues-an objective at least in the short term. Whether a state is
allocating personnel to achieve resource sustainability requires a longitudinal analysis.
Sustained production of revenues, the state trust lands management objective, requires that
assets-both land and labor-be employed for the best long term benefit. It may be that
personnel are engaged in long term management programs that have yet to produce
revenues. In these cases, prospective future revenues should be discounted to the present
to examine efficiencies, or longer term average revenues could be used as a metric, or other
justification provided. What is important is that there is a standard by which the managing
agency must justify its personnel allocations to the beneficiary.
90. Unlike the Forest Service, with its cumbersome mandate and unsuitable data system,
trust land managers have a clear mandate and clear criteria for getting marginal lands out
of production. See, Society of American Foresters, Report of the Below-Cost Timber Sales
Task Force, Fiscal and Social Responsibility in National Forest Management (1986) and Wolf,
supra note 31.
91. Spearman rank cross correlation procedures were used to test significance. A
moderate level of correlation is significant at the 90 percent level, while a high level of
correlation is significant at the 95 percent confidence interval. All statistical tests, unless
otherwise cited, are based on the procedures found in S. Siegel & N. Castellan, Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (2d ed. 1988). Calculations were done using the
SYSTAT version 5.0 (SYSTAT, Inc., Evanston, 11. 1989) statistics package. Significance tests
at 90 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals were conducted based on the procedures
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of revenues expended on land office management is a better indicator of
returns per employee than any other indicator, including the organizational
structure or the funding mechanism.' Our analysis additionally showed
that labor productivity was not statistically different among organizational
types, although that finding was not very strong.93
The information provided by our correlation analyses confirms that the
states are working within a classic production situation. At low levels of
leased acreage, the labor return is low due to the fixed minimum number
of people required in an office. Labor productivity increases as the amount
of leased land increases-at least up to a point-since additional staff are
not required to manage more land. Past this point, additional leased land
requires additional employees, and at some point, each additional staff
members' contribution to revenues decreases because the management is
extended to less productive acreage.
One implication of our analyses is that high expenditures per acre of
trust land do not necessarily result in high gross revenues. This implies that
the link between expenditures and revenues is not direct, but is caused by
other factors such as efficiency in operations and/or the quality of the lands
and resources managed in the individual states. The results point to a
couple of possible causal mechanisms. First, it appears that some states may
be skimming the cream off their resources by keeping personnel levels low.
This effect is more indicative of cost-constrained management than revenue
or profit maximization, a sanctioned objective. Secondly, the possibility that
some states achieve efficiencies in the management of trust lands (i.e.,
returns to scale) was not demonstrated by our data at the program level."
The combination of positive labor and negative land scale efficiencies
means that we can discredit two possible relationships: (1)that states with
large leased areas enjoy either higher returns per acre from their lands, a
greater efficiency in their use of personnel, or larger gross revenues
resulting from large leased acreage; and (2) that there is an overall return
to scale factor that benefits states with large acreage, which would be seen
in the program-level labor factor returns." Once we have established that

in Seigal & Castellan, id. at 242, app. tbl. Q,using one-tailed probabilities since the sign of
the relationship is known. Only statistically significant results are reported unless otherwise
noted. See, Souder, supra note 42, at 72-77, 79-81 for detailed references.
92. Groups for percent expenditures are -5 percent, 6 percent to 15 percent, 16 percent to
25 percent, and > 25 percent of revenues. Groups for aggregate expenditures are -15 percent;
16 percent to 25 percent; and > 25 percent of revenues. Groups for funding mechanism are:
cost recovery from revenues; fixed percentage of revenues; and legislative appropriation. See,
Souder, supra note 42, at 112 for details and data sources.
93. It is easier in a statistical sense to show that differences do not exist than to determine
that one group is "better or worse" than another. Id. at 111-13.
94. Id. at 81-83.
95. Id. at 75, tbl. 4-2.
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these relationships do not exist, it is reasonable to look within each states'
management program to determine whether resources are being effectively
used on a program-by-program basis.
Funding Mechanisms. The influence that funding mechanisms have on
personnel allocation led us to wonder if how the land offices receive
funding affects their programs. State land offices are funded in three
different ways: (1) offices expend as much money as needed to manage
lands, with the remainder going to the beneficiaries or their 'permanent
funds; (2) they can expend a fixed percentage of either their surface lease
revenues or a percentage of their total revenues; or (3) their expenditures
are determined by the legislature and come from the state's general fund.
We wondered whether there was a disproportionate imbalance in surface
compared to mineral program expenditures that resulted from receiving
funding based on the source of the revenues. We found that there was a
significant difference in personnel allocations as a result of funding
procedures: where offices were funded only by a percentage of surface
revenues, there was a statistically significant imbalance between surface
and mineral management.9 This suggests that tying budgets-hence
agency activities-to accomplishment of objectives is crucial for effective,
sustainable, management.
Summary. It is clear from our analysis that the information available from
the trustee should be sufficient to allow the beneficiary to determine
whether the trust is being efficiently managed.' By managing only
productive lands, the likelihood of over-management is reduced. Sufficient
information should be collected to determine at what point additional
management expenditures are not worthwhile to the trust, that is, marginal
lands should be either sold or that only custodial management should
occur." Thus the accountability theme leads directly to the enforceability
theme by providing evidence of agency actions.
Enforceability. Clarity in goals and accountability give rise to the
possibility of enforcement. Trusts are, in fact, designed in major part as
means to direct resource managers who the trustor cannot or does not

96. Id. at 115.
97. We are not alonq in identifying accountability as crucial in oversight of land management: Utah's state auditor found that the procedures used by the land office were
insufficient to determine whether they were efficiently managing their trust assets. Off. of
the Legis. Auditor Gen., supra note 76, at ii, 13-18.
98. This has traditionally been a problem in federal lands management. Whether all trust
lands are required to be managed was examined by the California attorney general who
found that "there is no compulsion on the state to sell or lease any of the lands." Op. Att'y
General 63-48 (June 5, 1963), at 211.
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know or, to put it simply, does not trust.99 Many centuries of judicial effort
to bind trustees to the trustor's intent have resulted in standards and
criteria that bear suggestively, sometimes directly, on sustainable resource
management.
Early school trust cases cited above, Lassen " and Ervien 101
confront fairly simple issues. The question in both was whether or not the
trustee could allocate trust resources to a more general public benefit in the
not unreasonable hope that the trust would also be enhanced. The answer
in both cases was, as we have seen, an unequivocal no.
It is not, however, particularly surprising that a clearly stated and
narrow purpose can be enforced in the courts.'" This discussion is aimed
beyond the importance of clarity to suggest the broader import for
sustainability in resource management of enforcing not just any clear
mandate, but of precisely the mandate elaborated in trust principles. To
illustrate, we will follow another apparently narrow theme-is the
obligation of the trustee to obtain full and fair market value in leasing trust
resources-to show that enforcement is possible and important to
sustainability. We will see two things: first, even so clear an economic
priority as fair market value is potentially important to advocates of
sustainable resource management; and second, that the ground rules for
reviewing trustee behavior are meaningfully different from those under
which resource managers normally operate.
The following cases are notable because it vindicates the beneficiary's
claim against the trustee in the face of clear legislative statement to the contrary."os In different resource settings, in different states, protection and
"wise use"-at least of the value--of a resource were at risk. The two
examples are (1) agricultural and grazing leases in Oklahoma;"°4 and (2)
timber sale contracts in Washington."o In each case, trust principles
yielded a considerably different result than one would predict in a
traditional public resource case. This justifies exploring the possibility that

99. Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's Public Trust Theory of
Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibility of Law Reform, 44
Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1209, 1214-1216 (1991).
100. Lassen, supra note 39.
101. Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41 (1919).
102. The growing importance of the Endangered Species Act, Endangered Species Act of
1973, as amended 1978, 16 U.S.C.A.§§ 1531-1543, in diverse contexts simply heightens our
awareness that if and when the mandate is clear, the Courts will hold the administrator to
it.
103. When we come to discuss perpetuity, we will recall that a trust is durable and not
easily altered by legislatures under transient political pressure. See infra note 111 and
accompanying text.
104. Oklahoma Education Assoc. v. Nigh, 642 P2d. 230 (Okla. 1982).
105. County of Skamania v. State, 685 P.2d 576 (Wash. 1984).
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judicial participation would have a different and more salubrious impact
on sustainable management in the trust context than in the more familiar
administrative setting.
Trust principles were successfully used to attack cross-resource
subsidization in Oklahoma Education Ass'n, Inc. v. Nigh."° The state
legislature had directed the trustee to lease lands for agricultural and
grazing use at a maximum rent of three percent of their appraised value,
well below fair market value. Further, the trustee was to make loans from
the permanent fund for first farm and ranch mortgages at a legislatively
directed maximum of 8.5 percent interest." The beneficiary sued to keep
trust assets from being transferred to farmers. The court found that "the use
of trust fund assets for the purpose of subsidizing farmers and ranchers is
contrary to the provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution, and to the
provisions of the Oklahoma Enabling Act."' 8
The more interesting case in this context is County of Skamania v.
State."' It permits a fairly direct comparison of management under trust
principles and the multiple use mandate. Expecting future increases in the
price of timber, purchasers in the late 1970s bid high prices for contracts on
both Forest Service and Washington State school trust lands. When the
recession of the early 1980s caused timber prices to decline precipitously,
both the Federal Congress and the Washington State Legislature were
pressured to allow timber purchasers to renege on their contracts."0 Both
the Congress and the Washington Legislature obliged. The state statute was
enacted over the objections of the trustee Department of Natural Resources."' Skamnania County, as a beneficiary of the trust, sued the state to
overturn the legislation as a breach of the trust."' The State Supreme
Court found for the County, requiring that the State contracts be fulfilled,
holding that "no prudent trustee could conclude that the unilateral termination of these contracts was in the best interest of the trusts.""3 Thus, although Federal timber purchasers were not held to their contracts, state
purchasers were.

106. Oklahoma Education Association v. Nigh, 642 P2d. 230, 235-236 (Okla. 1982).
[Contrast with NRDC v. Hodel, CIV #S 86-054-8-EJ6 (1986)].
107. Id. at 235.
108. Id. at 236.
109. Skamania, 685 P.2d 576.
110. Federal Timber Contract Payment Modification Act of 1984, 16 U.S.C. §618 (1988).
For a discussion of the effects of this act, and the general atmosphere regarding timber sales
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, see J. Mattey, The Timber Bubble That Burst: Government
Policy and the Bailout of 1984 (1990).
111. Forest Products Industry Recovery Act of 1982, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 79.01.1331 .1339 (West 1991) (expired Dec. 31, 1984). Section 6 of the Act allows for contract buyouts.
112. Skamania, 685 P2d. 576, 579.
113. Id. at 583.
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In both of these cases, the beneficiaries were helped by the availability
of the judicial forum to enforce trust principles. Indeed, it is easy to become
so enthralled by undivided loyalty that one misses the fact that trust principles alter the nature of the judicial forum in which many school lands
issues are heard: the courts approach trustees with considerably less
deference than they view administrators. Traditional principles of administrative review favor the administrator; trust law, on the other hand, bends
towards 4protecting the beneficiary and the trustor's intentions from the
trustee."
The administrator's advantage arises from the fact that the Court must
respect agency discretion: it cannot substitute its judgment for the administrator's, and it must defer to the administrator's expertise."' These
presumptions are not always dispositive, and they certainly do not define
a zone where an administrator can depend on acting without close scrutiny
from the judiciary, but they are the starting presumptions. The Court's
willingness to take a "hard look" at administrative decisions ebbs and flows
across time, place, and issue; even when it peaks, however, the Court must
respect the agency, its expertise and its discretion.
The shoe is on the other foot in the case of a trustee. The court seeks
specifically to assess whether the trustee has met the "prudent person"
standard: did the trustee act with prudence in handling the trust assets?
The effect of any apparent or alleged expertise on the part of the trustee is
not to insulate his or her decision from scrutiny, but rather to require him
or her to meet higher and higher standards of prudence." 6
This slight tilt in the table does not mean that the beneficiary always
"wins." Lessees have won many cases against school land administrators,
particularly when challenging a decision not to grant the lessee a preference
right to a lease renewal." 7 These cases are generally resolved within the
parameters of normal administrative law principles. They afford no special
protection either to beneficiaries or to trustees seeking to protect the trust.
However, the potential exists for a different set of standards and outcomes:
when the beneficiary rather than the lessee sues alleging a breach of trust,
trust principles are clearly the basis for judicial analysis. This does give
both the trust and the diligent trustee an extra measure of clout. Trust
114. This discussion applies, obviously, to issues in which the trustee is challenged as
such. Typically, this means when the trustee is challenged by a beneficiary. When a lessee
challenges an administrative decision, trust principles are frequently not even mentioned.
115. Scenic Hudson PreservationConf. v. FPC,453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407
U.S. 926 (1972) is the classic statement of what gets weighed in this context.
116. A friend of the family or surviving spouse, for example, will pass muster with the
Court if he or she evinces ordinary prudence in handling trust assets. A trustee who claims
skill in handling resources, such as a bank, will be held to a higher standard of care. Bogert,
supra note 4, at § 541.
117. See, Kerrigan v. Miller, 84 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1938) and references cited therein.
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principles are not always the factor; however, when they are invoked, they
are enforceable. The special context provides the trust added protection
from self-serving or politically or legislatively harassed administrators.
This explicit enforceability of the trust, and its peculiar context for
judicial decisionmaking is not, we repeat, a panacea. However it clearly has
potential for protecting long term resource commitments from politically
pressured legislatures and managers and provides another tool in
managing for sustainability.
Perpetuity.The three strains that we have already discussed, accountability,
clarity, and enforceability, each contribute to what we characterize as
perpetuity. But it is the perpetual nature of the trust doctrine as applied to
school lands that we see as providing the essence of sustainability.
The original school land grants did not clearly establish a perpetual
trust, or even a trust.1 8 Indeed, early constitutions contemplated that the
land be sold," 9 and early state programs frequently utilized the lands for
such purposes as salaries for teachers.' 20 It is clear that at the outset the
grants were to get school systems started and that little thought was given
121
to long term management.
Perpetuity became a component of the school trust when the "permanent school funds" were established. The earliest school land grants, as the
"old northwest" states between Ohio and Michigan joined the Union, were
made to townships to support schools in each township. In 1849 during the
Michigan accession, the State became the grant recipient: this was an
explicit embrace of perpetuity because the state was obligated to set up a
fund, known ever after as a "permanent school fund,"'" and a formula for
disbursing the receipts. Thereafter, states enacted increasingly elaborate
provisions for supplementing the fund and for protecting it against loss and
diversion."z' Permanence in the school funds and in land management is
118. See, H. Taylor, The Educational Significance of the Early Federal Land Ordinances 123
(1922).
119. Many states did sell all or the vast majority of their lands. See, P. Gates, History of
Public Land Law Development 236-39 (photo. reprint 1979) (1968).
120. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 807; F. Swift, History of Public PermanentCommon School Funds
in the United States 1795-1905, at 107 passim, Ill (1911).
121. Fairfax, supra note 1, at 806-07 and references therein.
122. Id. at 824. supra note 94, for a discussion of the technical names of what are
ubqguitously referred to as permanent school funds.
123. Examples of common language are "shall be held by the said state in trust .... No
mortgage or other encumbrance of the said lands ... shall be valid in favor of any person
.... Said lands shall not be sold or leased ... except to the highest and best bidder at a
public auction .... All lands, leaseholds, timber and other products of land before being
offered shall be appraised at their true value, and no sale or other disposal thereof shall be
made for a consideration less than the value so ascertained ....
New Mexico-Arizona
Enabling Act, As Amended, § 10 (Act of June 20,1910,36 Stat. 557, ch. 310). Seealso, Fairfax,
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a hallmark of the program and perhaps its most persuasive tie to current
sustainability discussions.
The discussions of clarity, accountability and enforceability indicate
that under the trust lands regime, perhaps you can sustain the production
of dollars. One might agree that what we have achieved, up to this point,
is implementation of the economic and continuing physical production
notions of sustainability. Or, one might suggest that the trust provides
opportunities to improve upon the sustained yield notions that dominate
federal forestry.
But what about the broader definitions of sustainability? We see two
bases for arguing that school lands management can be more inclusive than
mere physical production or economic sustainability. Both are rooted in the
trust principle that the trustee's duty to produce current income does not
obviate the requirement to protect the trust corpus. In this discussion we
will point to two crucial contexts in which the school lands commitment to
perpetuity trumps the emphasis on current income generation and clearly
provides for achieving broader notions of sustainability in trust land
management programs."2 First, ambiguity about future conditions
transcends the requirement for current income and thus gives rise to
conservative management styles."z Second, rising resource prices may
surpass income and resultant dividends from the permanent fund. 26
Again, this leads to an emphasis on conservative management.
Numerous court decisions and state programs illustrate the first and
simplest point. For example, in 1988, the Arizona Appellate court agreed
with the land office that in some situations it was better to do nothing than
to lease lands for one use that might be incompatible with future uses.
Confronted with a grazing lessee's effort to tie up land in a rapidly
developing area, the Court held that the Commissioners are required to
make "best use" of lands." They supported the Commissioner's conclusion that "keeping its options open may, under certain circumstances, be the
'best use' of the land."'12
The Courts are clearly not always required to force trust notions on
retrograde or embattled trustees. Trust principles guide the trustee. Trust
managers rely on the duty to protect the corpus and maintain its productiv-

supra note 1, at 811-812, 820 passim.
124. Oklahoma Education Assoc. v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230, 237-238 (Okla. 1982).
125. See the discussion of Havasu infra note 130 and accompanying text, and discussion
of Washington's Olympic Peninsula experimental forest, infra note 138 and accompanying
text.
126. See Souder, supra note 42, at 140-146.
127. Havasu Heights Ranch and Dev. Corp. v. State Land Dep't, 764 P2d. 37, 42 (Ariz.
App. 1988).
128. Id.
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ity in dealing with recalcitrant lessees, and quote it in defending their
programs. In three additional disputes, the timber programs in Oregon and
Washington, and New Mexico's grazing program, trustees have extended
the trust mandate beyond simple current revenue maximization.
In Oregon, the Department of Forestry manages the timbered school
trust lands through an agreement with the Department of State Lands,'2
as well as other timber lands where the counties are the beneficiaries."
Even though the production of revenues remains the primary objective,
"consideration is given to the need to protect soils, streams, wildlife habitat,
recreational opportunities, and other environmental values."' 3' The state
forests are used to provide physically mature, rather than economically
mature, trees. Specifically, the department has decided to produce large,
older trees suitable for sawlogs rather than younger ones used for pulp."2
Intensive management practices are conducted to increase future
yields." There is even an explicit difference in the time horizon between
the counties and the school lands: the Department of Forestry uses a 4.5
percent real discount rate to evaluate improvements on county trust lands,
but a 3.5 percent rate for the school lands in the Elliot State Forest."3
Washington takes a more encompassing strategy to incorporate sustainability in their forest management plans. This may result from their
comparatively larger land and revenues base, or from the higher level of
state controversy over harvest practices. 35 When questions arose about
the sustainability of biological, economic and social systems dependent
upon old growth timber, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), the
trustee, established the Olympic Experimental State Forest to "be a 264,000129. Timber Management Contract, Oregon State Land Board, Oregon State Department
of Forestry, August 2, 1982 (copy in files of authors).
130. Oregon State Forestry Department, Long Range Timber Management Plan,
Willamette Region State Forests 3 (Report 3-0-2-210, September, 1989).

131. Id.
132. Id. at 12 (Oregon's decision to produce longer-rotation age sawlogs compared to
short-rotation wood fiber).
133. L. Jones, "State Forest Land" in Assessment of Oregon's Forests, 1988, 52 (A Collection
of Papers Published by the Oregon State Department of Forestry, 1988).
134. Willamette Region State Forests, supra note 130, at 11 (citing Level IV intensive
management practices returning a 4.5 percent internal rate of return). Oregon State Forestry
Department, Long Range Timber Management Plan, Southern Oregon Region State Forests
10 (Report 3-0-2-220, August, 1987) (citing discount rate used to calculate present net value
of early harvests of common school lands).
135. Washington has about 1.8 million acres of commercial timber land (WDNR, 19841993 Forest Land Management Program 22 (Nov. 1983)), while Oregon has 735 thousand
acres managed by the state (Jones, supra note 136, at 50). Most of Oregon's state-owned
forest lands came to the state as a result of tax defaults after forest fires. In contrast,
Washington, particularly on the Olympic Peninsula, has 200 thousand acres of old growth.
As a result, the level of controversy over management of state trust lands timber in
Washington is higher than in Oregon.
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acre proving ground for theories and technology that hold promise for
allowing sustainable timber production and important ecological values to
exist side by side." " The experimental forest is not without immediate
costs because timber harvests will be deferred on spotted owl habitat
covering 63,000 acres of the Forest, 37 while another three thousand acres
of old growth will be sold from the trust for preservation.1"
The third example of perpetuity in the form of protecting the trust
corpus is New Mexico's Range Stewardship Incentive Program. This
is a case where protection of the corpus, especially the productive capability
of the lands to produce forage in the future, offsets the current income
received from grazing fees. Grazing fees are determined by a formula that
incorporates the value of comparable private grazing rates per head of cattIe-using adjustments based on beef and producer prices-and then
multiplies this fee by the carrying capacity of the land to determine the total
rental. Under the stewardship program, participating lessees have the
range condition on their allotments monitored every five years by outside
specialists. Those lessees whose lands are in good or better condition, with
a stable or an increasing trend, receive a 25 percent reduction in their
fees."4 The state land office expects that directly connecting land
condition to rental fees will provide incentives for good management. 41
Initiatives for protecting trust resources-known and potential-in
relation to generating current revenues have not all been at the discretion
of the trustee; indeed, there is a significant line of case law that obligates the
trustee to consider it. The issue of whether the state has to receive maximum present value compared to best use in the long term value was
litigated in Havasu Heights Ranch and Dev. Corp. v. State Land Dep't."

136. S. Crickenberger, "ManagementPhilosophy Quickly Puts Winning Techniques to Work."
33 Totem 16 (Winter, 1991).
137. The cost of this deferral'in terms of timber volumes is estimated to be 1,000 boardfeet per year per acre, or 63 million board feet for the entire area. Pat McElroy, Deputy
Supervisor, Washington Department of Natural Resources, telephone conversation,
November 18, 1992.
138. Note that in the 3,000 acres, the trust is receiving fair market value for the lands and
timber. Money from the real estate portion of the sale will be use to purchase replacement
land, while the revenues from the timber will go to the beneficiaries. C. Partridge,
Breakthrough Concept Offers Creative Alternative, New Optimism, 33 Totem 6 (Winter, 1991).
139. New Mexico State Land Office, Range Stewardship Incentive Program (document on
file with the authors, n.d.) and New Mexico State Land Office, State Land Office Rule 8, 7-8,
19 (Draft #4, June 22, 1992).
140. The grazing fee system used for this program has not had a court test.
141. Interestingly, this feature has been incorporated into the BLM's new proposals for
federal grazing fees. 'Incentive-Based' Grazing Fees Proposed, Albuquerque Journal, October

30, 1992.
142. Havasu Heights Ranch and Dev. Corp. v. State Land Dep't, 764 P.2d 37 (Ariz. App.
1988).
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As noted above, Court held there that state could withhold land from
leasing if it believed that the future use value would be greater if left
undeveloped, i.e. unleased. The lessee would not have a compensatory
interest in the lease and improvements that would lessen the ultimate value
of the property to the trust."
Another prospect for protecting the corpus of the trust is to leave the
minerals in the ground and the trees on the stump.'" Instead of harvesting the resource, and then placing the revenues in the permanent fund, the
4
resource is "banked" where it exists."
This strategy can be justified
where the value of the commodity produced from the land is increasing at
a faster rate than the compounded interest in the permanent fund. This has
happened
over the past 25 years with oil and gas, coal, and high-quality
46
timber.
Perpetuity is maintained by the provision for permanent funds, where
revenues from non-renewable resources and land sales income are placed.
Problems exist, however, with the permanent funds because of restrictive
investment and inflation effects. States are working to overcome this: for
example, Montana distributes only 95 percent of renewable revenues to
beneficiaries, with 5 percent going into the permanent fund; and distributes
only 95 percent of the dividends of the permanent fund and retaining the
other 5 percent. 47 This off-sets inflation of up to 5 percent to maintain the
"purchasing power" of the permanent fund. Other states are working towards this." One way is through equity investments where states
receive both dividends (current income) while having growth and
offsetting inflation. New Mexico
allows up to 20 percent of its permanent
4
fund to be invested in stocks.1
We see a direct relationship in the trust lands case between perpetual
revenue production and the perpetual capacity to produce them. We have
seen here that even in the trust lands case, perpetuity can mean more than
just revenue production. By protecting the resources against special interest

143. Id. at 41, 43.
144. For an expanded discussion, see Souder, supra note 42, at 136 passim.
145. This assumes that the costs and risks of protecting the resources in place are factored
into the decision. Note also that in the case of oil and gas, state law may require
"unitization" if a percentage (it varies by state) of lease holders desire to produce in a field.
146. Souder, supra note 42, at 142-147.
147. Montana Constitution, Art. X, § 5.
148. Interview with Tim Kingstad, Commissioner, N. D. St. Land Dep't., Bismarck, N.D.,
Nov. 12, 1991.
149. See State Investment Council, Statement of Objectives for the State Permanent Fund,
Rule 85-3 (Sept. 30, 1985). Historically, investments in stocks have been problematical for
the states. Cf. discussion in F. Swift, A History of Public PermanentCommon School Funds in
the United States, 1795-1905,132,149-53 (1911). See cites therein under index entry "Securities,
poor, unsafe, worthless."
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groups--whether they be lessees or legislatures-the ultimate focus is upon
protecting the lands themselves. The examples provided here show that
this can be done by the trustees acting on their own, or will happen as a
result of court decisions. But whichever occurs, the focus of the trust
mandate remains on protecting the corpus in the long-term, enabling it to
remain a sustainable source of benefits.
IV. What This Analysis Tells Us About the Usefulness of the Trust
Responsibility in Sustained Public Resource Management
The state school lands experience contributes to discussion of sustainability in three ways. First, the school trust lands underscore the importance of institutional design. Clarity in objectives, accountability, and the
requirement for undivided loyalty to the beneficiary of the trust establish
clear priorities for management decisions. Second, the history of school
lands controversies suggest that the details of enforcement mechanisms
matter. Trust land disputes demonstrate that long term commitments are
vulnerable to machinations of both legislatures and managers. However,
the peculiar role of the beneficiary and the peculiar context in which
trustee's actions are reviewed in the school lands disputes provide
important examples of enforcement that emphasizes substance rather than
procedural oversight. Finally, the trust's insistence on protection of the
productive capabilities, in concert with the perpetual nature of the trust
responsibility, provides a working concept of sustainable resource
management. Even in a context where financial returns are defined as the
primary goal, the school lands experience provides important insight into
achieving perpetual commitment to sustainable resource management.
Institutional structure matters. The role of the beneficiary in
providing clarity about priorities is crucial to sustainable resource
management under the trust. The structure of the trust mandate requires
the states to think clearly about who is the beneficiary, and what is the
effect of their actions on that beneficiary. The clarity of the trustee's
mandate-undivided loyalty to a specified beneficiary-does not entirely
remove the self-interest of the manager from decision making. We see clear
examples, specifically in the allocation of personnel, where the beneficiary
is subsidizing the manager. However the clarity about goals makes
meaningful accountability conceivable.
When combined with the reporting and disclosure requirements of
the trust, the clarity also makes it possible to monitor trust land management to a degree not possible in traditional public resource management.
It is possible to trace the effects of management actions and-within fairly
limited constraints-to determine if actions serve the stated goals. The
most definitive finding from our economic analysis is that the procedures
used to fund the trust lands managing agency are important. This is true
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both for the efficient allocation of personnel and for the amount of effort
expended managing trust resources.se Surely the trustee must have sufficient power over its budget so that it can respond to changing management
needs. At the same time, the agency must be under sufficient accountability-representing beneficiary interests-to control unwarranted expenditures. It is also important to be able to dig deep into how an agency functions-at individual staff and lease level-to determine whether goals and
objectives are being met."5 ' State school land management is not a perfect
model of appropriate institutional design, or for that matter, of trust
management. It does, however, demonstrate that accountability is possible
once the goals are clear.
Enforcement mechanisms also matter. The judicial enforcement
that is built into the trust concept is different from thoseprovide available
to critics of administrative agencies. First, trust law provides the beneficiary
with important, well-defined tools for compelling attention to trust
resource allocation. The Skamania case cited is not atypical: undivided
loyalty means something real, and it is sufficient to prevent raids on the
trust even when perpetrated by the State Legislature. Second, the courts are
not obligated to defer to agency expertise or to their interpretation of their
own mandate.
One might object that all this is interesting, but that it is tied to
revenue production, which is not the goal of most sustainability advocates.
Although the Land Commission's traditional emphasis on revenues has not
endeared the school land traditions to environmentalists, 15 2 we argue that
the reticence ought to be carefully reevaluated. Even where the stated goal
of the trust is to maximize economic returns, reliance on present net worth
revenue maximization is not necessarily in the best interest of the beneficiary, particularly if externalities resulting from such actions adversely affect
them.
Further, other components of the trust-its emphasis on perpetuity
and on the preservation of the corpus of the trust-lead to management
that is certainly more conservative than some have feared, and plausibly
more conservative than public resource management which is not so constrained and directed. Part of this conservatism arises from the barriers
noted above that the trust presents to managers who would manage the
150. See Souder, supra note 42, at 52-54 for the effects of expenditures on trust
responsibilities.
151. This is based on interview with Kevin Carter, Unit Manager, Trust and Asset
Management, Div. of State Lands & Forestry in Salt Lake City, UT (July 25,1991); interview
with Mike Brand, Surface Leasing Manager, N.D. Surface Leasing Manager in Bismarck N.D.
(Nov. 12, 1991); and J.Souder, Address to N.M. State Land Office staff (Feb. 4, 1992).
152. See W. Patric, Trust Land Administration in the Western States, passim (Public Lands
Institute Report, 1981) for a comparison of federal and state trust land provisions for access
and multiple use.
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school lands for the benefit of the trustee. The barriers are not perfect. We
have seen, for example, that analytically it is difficult to distinguish selfserving over investment from what might be characterized as legitimate
investment for long term management. However, we do not see in the
school lands the massive cross-subsidies between resources, for example
the trading timber for roads, that characterize federal lands management.1m Management actions must be justified by tying costs and gains
to the beneficiary.
If we have been convincing that school trust land management is
worth considering, what is the next step? It would be fruitful to ponder
what the consequences for different stakeholders would be some specific
public lands were transformed into such a trust," or if specific disputes
were approached with the school lands experience in mind." We also
urge advocates of sustainability to identify a beneficiary and other
particulars of a hypothetical trust instrument that would achieve sustainable resource management in particular settings. Is it possible to design a

153. This issue is specifically addressed under the topic "below-cost timber sales." See
Wolf, supra note 31, at 1063,1068-71; and Below-Cost Timber Sales Task Force Report, supra
note 90, passim. Those cross-subsidies that do occur-for example the investment of
permanent funds in first farm mortgages-are explicit in terms of the trust document. See
Oklahoma Education Assoc. v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230,237,243 (Okla. 1982) and our discussion
in Fairfax, supra note 1, at 865, 868-73.
154. We are not advocating a transformation of the National Forests or BLM lands into
a school lands type trust. This possibility has been appraised in the OTA Report, supra note
26, at 48. We are arguing that our lexicon for discussing sustainability is enhanced
substantially by looking beyond the Forest Service model to other traditions of land
management155. Some movement is occurring in this direction. Perhaps the best example is the Platte
River Whooping Crane Maintenance Trust in Grand Island, NE. This $75 million trust was
established in 1978 as part of mitigation for the Grayrocks Dam and Reservoir in Wyoming,
a unit of the Missouri Basin Power Project. C. Bowen, Grayrocks - A New Approach to
Mitigation, The Mitigation Symposium: A National Workshop on Mitigating Losses of Fish and
Wildlife Habitats (1979). The trust is established similar to the examples cited in our
discussion, i.e., it has a trust instrument, trustees, and a corpus consisting originally of the
$7.5 million dollars and now including lands and easements subsequently purchased. Platte
River Whooping Crane Maintenance Trust, Inc. "Amended Trust Declaration." November
20, 1981. Since its establishment, the trust has protected over 10,000 acres of crane habitat
through purchase and easements along the Big Bend reach of the Platte River, an active
research program, and public education through its Summer Orientation About Rivers
(SOAR) program for school children and a publication, The Braided River. Platte River
Whooping Crane Maintenance Trust, Inc. "The Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat
Maintenance Trust: A Ten Year Report" (1989).
Free-market economists have also focused on trusts as a mechanism to lessen the
effects of environmental interest groups in controlling federal lands. See J. Baden, Saving
Wilderness and Biodiversity Through Trust Funds, 12 Forest Watch 22 (June, 1922) as an
example. While we do not necessarily agree with his result, we are certainly in accord that
the topic is worth examination.
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trust instrument that would achieve the an advocate's goals? If so, what
process could be used to define the trust beneficiary, and construct
management institutions that would ensure that the aims of the trust were
fulfilled? These trust designs might not turn out to be implementable
proposals, but the analysis would be clarifying.
Those who advocate sustainability must move beyond issues of
definitions towards how to implement and institutionalize it. They will find
in the school lands an instructive illustration of twenty-two different
approaches, and a long standing body of case law and experience in
monitoring and enforcing a commitment to perpetual management of
resources that is very much worth their consideration.

